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What can we see when we do not pay attention? It is well known
that we can be ‘‘blind’’ even to major aspects of natural scenes
when we attend elsewhere. The only tasks that do not need
attention appear to be carried out in the early stages of the visual
system. Contrary to this common belief, we report that subjects can
rapidly detect animals or vehicles in briefly presented novel natural
scenes while simultaneously performing another attentionally
demanding task. By comparison, they are unable to discriminate
large T’s from L’s, or bisected two-color disks from their mirror
images under the same conditions. We conclude that some visual
tasks associated with ‘‘high-level’’ cortical areas may proceed in
the near absence of attention.
Psychologists have long known that certain visual search tasksrequire minimal or no attention. A hallmark of preattentive
vision is that it is achieved in a seemingly parallel fashion: a
preattentive task may be carried out simultaneously with other
visual tasks (1); target detection does not become significantly
more difficult when the number of distractors is increased (2, 3).
However, none of the known preattentive tasks approaches the
sophistication of everyday vision, where complex scenes must be
scrutinized to assess high-level properties such as the presence of
danger and the structure of a social interaction. Virtually all of
the visual tasks that may be performed preattentively have been
explained, either in detail or in principle, by quasilinear models
that replicate mechanisms found in the early stages of our visual
system (4, 5). Although much can be accomplished by these
simple mechanisms, it is quite clear that they are inadequate for
explaining ‘‘high-level’’ perception such as recognition and
categorization—i.e., visual processes that rely on neural activities
in inferior temporal cortex and beyond (6–8). This would suggest
that there is no sophisticated property of the scene that we can
see without paying attention. In agreement with this view,
change blindness and inattentional blindness studies demon-
strate that without visual attention, significant changes in a large
part of the visual field can easily escape our awareness (9–12).
On the other hand, some complex visual tasks can be rapidly
accomplished by our visual system. RSVP (rapid serial visual
presentation) experiments have demonstrated that natural ob-
jects belonging to a specified category may be classified remark-
ably fast (13, 14). Thorpe and colleagues (15–19) have found that
complex natural scenes can be categorized in as little as 150 ms.
This astonishing speed relative to the time constant of informa-
tion processing and transmission in networks of neurons raises
the question of whether attention plays a critical role in this type
of rapid visual processing. Our results indicate that there is little
or no attentional cost in rapid visual categorization of complex,
natural images.
Materials and Methods
Subjects. Five right-handed subjects, including two authors
(F.F.L. and R.V.R.), were tested in the main experiment. Four
right-handed subjects, including the same two authors, were
tested in the vehicleanimal categorization experiments, as well
as the color disk control experiment. Five right-handed subjects,
including the same two authors, were tested in the TL discrim-
ination control experiment. Ages ranged from 20 to 26 (average
24). One other subject was discarded because he could not
maintain his attentional focus on the central letter discrimination
task under the dual task condition.
Database. The pictures were complex color scenes taken from a
large commercially available CD-ROM library allowing access
to several thousand stimuli (15). The animal category images
included more than 800 pictures of mammals, birds, fish, insects,
and reptiles. In a separate experiment (Fig. 3 b and c), an
additional target category was used—vehicles. The vehicle cat-
egory images (more than 800) included pictures of cars, trucks,
trains, airplanes, ships, and hot-air balloons. There was also a
very wide range of more than 900 distractor images, which
included natural landscapes, city scenes, food, fruits, plants,
houses, and artificial objects.
Experimental Setup. Subjects were seated in a dark room specially
designed for psychophysics experiments. The seat was approxi-
mately 120 cm from a computer screen (1,024  1,286 pixels, 3
 8 bit RGB), connected to a Silicon Graphics (Mountain View,
CA) O2 computer. The refresh rate of the monitor was 75 Hz.
We used a photocell and oscilloscope to ensure that the exper-
imental setup achieved the desired refreshing rate for our
experiment. The display was synchronized with the vertical
retrace of the monitor.
Training Procedure. Each experiment required a significant train-
ing period. It usually took more than 10 h (approximately 12,000
trials of all different tasks combined) for a subject to coordinate
their motor responses well enough to answer both a speeded
peripheral task and the central task. The central SOA (stimulus
onset asynchrony, the time between the appearance of the
central stimulus and the onset of the central mask), starting at
500 ms, was decreased after each block where the performance
of this task exceeded 85%. The procedure was terminated after
the subject’s performance had stabilized and the central SOA
was below 250 ms. This value was chosen to limit the possibility
of switching attention during stimulus presentation. All tasks
received the same amount of training for each subject to avoid
bias for any particular task.
Experimental Paradigm. Each experiment (main experiment and
two control experiments) consisted of three different conditions:
an attentionally demanding central task (identical in all exper-
iments), a peripheral task (in which the role of attention was
investigated), and a dual task condition in which both the central
and peripheral task were performed concurrently. In each
experiment, all trials were organized in the same way irrespective
of the experimental condition (i.e., single task or dual task).
Central Letter Discrimination Task. Each trial started with a fixation
cross 300  100 ms before the onset of the first stimulus. At 0
ms, the central stimulus (a combination of five letters) was
Abbreviation: SOA, stimulus onset asynchrony.
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presented. The five letters (T’s and L’s, either all identical, or one
differing from the other four), appeared at nine possible loca-
tions within 1.2° eccentricity. Each letter was randomly rotated.
After the central SOA, each stimulus letter was masked by the
letter F. For a given subject, SOA is the same for both single task
and dual task condition. All trial types were presented with equal
probability. Subjects were instructed to respond by pressing ‘‘S’’
on the keyboard if the five letters were the same, or ‘‘D’’ if one
of the letters differed from the other four.
In a separate control experiment, we tested our subjects’
central performance with shortened SOAs. Subjects were in-
structed to perform the central letter discrimination task. For
each subject, the central SOA alternated in four blocks of 48
trials between two values: the subject’s original SOA that was
reached at the end of the training procedure, and another SOA
66 ms shorter.
Peripheral Task. In each peripheral task, the stimulus was always
presented 53 ms after the central stimulus onset and followed by
a perceptual mask. Subjects responded to these tasks in a
speeded fashion. They were instructed to continuously hold
down the mouse button and release it as fast as possible, within
1,000 ms, when they detected a target.
Natural scene categorization. The peripheral stimuli were nat-
ural images, half of them containing one or more target objects.
Each image (of size 3.2°  4.8°) was flashed for 27 ms at a
random location centered at around 6.1° eccentricity. Novel
images (1,056 in all) were used as test stimuli under dual task
condition for 11 blocks of 96 trials. The peripheral stimulus was
followed by a perceptual mask. Eight different masks were used.
Each of them was a colored picture of a mixture of white noise
at different spatial frequencies on which a naturalistic texture
was superimposed. The peripheral SOA was adjusted in the same
way as for the central SOA so that performance would stabilize
under 85%. Individual peripheral SOAs ranged from 53 to 80 ms.
For a given subject, SOA was the same for both single task and
dual task condition.
Peripheral letter discrimination. In this control experiment, the
peripheral stimulus (of size 1.5°  1.5°) was a randomly rotated
letter T or L masked by the letter F. The target was the letter L.
The peripheral SOA was determined individually as previously,
ranging from 53 to 160 ms. For a given subject, SOA is the same
for both single task and dual task condition.
Peripheral color pattern discrimination. In this control experi-
ment, the peripheral stimulus (of size 1.5° 1.5°) was a vertically
bisected disk with red and green halves. The target was the disk
in which red was on the right. The mask was a disk divided into
four quadrants, with red and green alternating between each
quadrant. The colors were matched for gray levels. The periph-
eral SOA was determined individually as previously, ranging
from 66 to 106 ms. For a given subject, SOA was the same for
both single task and dual task condition.
Dual Task. In all dual tasks, subjects were instructed to focus
attention on the central task. On each trial, they were supposed
to respond to the peripheral stimulus as fast as possible (with
their right hand) before the central stimulus (with their left
hand).
Results
We studied the role of attention in natural scene categorization
by using a dual task paradigm, in which a natural scene catego-
rization task, where target scenes were defined by the presence
of one or more animals, was performed concurrently with
another visual task that required visual attention (refs. 1, 20, and
21; Fig. 1). The idea is to compare subjects’ performance of the
categorization task under two conditions: the single task con-
dition where attention is available, and the dual task condition
where attention is drawn away by the other task. If the rapid
natural scene categorization task demands attention, we should
observe a significant decrease in performance under the
dual task condition. If the rapid natural scene categorization
does not entail much attentional cost, performances should be
comparable.
Our attentionally demanding task involves discriminating dis-
plays composed of five randomly rotated T’s and L’s at the center
of the visual field. Subjects needed to respond by pressing one
key when all five letters were the same and another key when one
of the letters differed from the other four. This task engages
attention at the center of the display, preventing attention from
focusing on the natural scene in the periphery (refs. 1 and 20; see
also Fig. 3 d and e). When our subjects performed this task alone,
their performances averaged around 77% (varied between 68%
and 82%; Fig. 2). This value can be used as a reference for the
dual task condition: if a subject has continuously engaged full
attention to the central task, we expect the performance to be
maintained at the same level; any significant distraction or
withdrawing of attention would decrease performance.
The natural scene categorization was a modification of the one
used by Thorpe and colleagues (15). A picture was flashed for
only 27 ms at a random location in the periphery of the visual
field, followed by a perceptual mask (Fig. 1). Subjects had to
decide whether the image contained an animal (or animals) or
not as fast and accurately as possible (15). When subjects
performed this task alone, their performance averaged around
76% (ranging from 75 to 79%; Fig. 2).
Under the dual task condition, subjects were instructed to
focus attention at the center of the display, and to try to perform
both tasks as accurately as possible. Because we were interested
in the reaction times of the natural scene categorization task, we
asked subjects to respond as fast as possible to the peripheral
task before answering the central task. For each subject, the
central task performance under the dual task condition showed
no difference (P  0.05) from its counterpart under the single
task condition (Fig. 2). This is a clear indication that attention
was locked at the center under the dual task condition. Further-
more, for each individual subject the average peripheral cate-
gorization performance under the dual task condition was not
significantly (t test, P  0.05) different from the corresponding
performance under the single task condition (Fig. 2), suggesting
that natural scene categorization can still be performed when
attention is drawn away (see also Fig. 3 a–c).
One might argue that subjects could first attend to the
peripheral stimulus before switching attention to the central one.
In that case, however, the time available to process the central
stimulus would be much shorter by at least 80 ms than the actual
central SOA (the peripheral stimulus is turned off 80 ms after the
onset of the central stimulus). This strategy would result in a
strong decrease in performance of the central task. Indeed, in a
separate control experiment, we asked all six subjects to perform
the central letter task with an SOA shortened by only 66 ms.
Their average performance dropped from 77% to 66% (indi-
vidual t test for each subject, P  0.01). This confirms that our
results do not reflect a systematic switch of attention between the
two tasks.
Because of its high motor coordination demands, the dual task
required extensive training. During this period, our subjects were
repetitively trained with the same set of 288 images. It could be
argued that such training could serve to optimize feature de-
tection mechanisms for specific stimuli, reducing the attentional
demands for this task (22, 23). However, the above results were
obtained with a set of 1,056 novel images that were never
presented during training. Furthermore, we show later (Fig. 3 d
and e) that the same amount of training in other dual tasks did
not reduce attentional demands. This makes it unlikely that our
results are a direct consequence of the training process. In
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addition to our experiments, a study done by Rousselet et al.
reaches a compatible conclusion with untrained subjects (24).
Reaction times measured under the single task condition are
compatible with results observed by Thorpe and colleagues (15),
suggesting that our natural scene categorization task is per-
formed in an ultra-rapid mode. Note that this task involves a
speeded response under both single and dual task conditions.
Under the dual task condition, while categorization perfor-
Fig. 1. Experimental protocol. (a) Schematic illustration of one trial. After a fixation cross presented at the center of the visual field, an attentionally demanding
letter discrimination task is presented centrally. The central stimulus (combination of five T’s and L’s) is then replaced by a perceptual mask (five F’s) after a time
interval commonly called the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA, ranging from 133 to 240 ms for different subjects). Subjects are instructed to respond whether
all five letters are the same or one of them is different. In the peripheral natural scene categorization task, an image is presented peripherally for 27 ms at a
random location, 53 ms after the onset of the central stimulus. The peripheral stimulus is followed (after peripheral SOA) by a perceptual mask. The peripheral
SOA varies individually for each subject, ranging from 53 to 80 ms. The peripheral mask always appears before the central stimulus is replaced by its own mask.
Subjects make a speeded response to the presence of animals. Under the dual task condition, subjects are required to perform both tasks concurrently. (b) Sample
images of the stimulus database. The pictures are complex color scenes taken from a large commercially available CD-ROM library allowing access to several
thousand stimuli. The animal category images include pictures of mammals, birds, fish, insects, and reptiles. In a separate experiment (Fig. 3 b and c), an additional
target category is used—vehicles. The vehicle category images include pictures of cars, trucks, trains, airplanes, ships, and hot-air balloons. There is also a very
wide range of distractor images, which includes natural landscapes, city scenes, food, fruits, plants, houses, and artificial objects.
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mance is unaffected, we observe an average delay of 117 ms in
response times compared with the single task condition (single
task, 491 ms; dual task, 608 ms). This delay is likely to arise
because of central rather than perceptual attentional competi-
tion (25). Indeed, when subjects are required to perform two
tasks simultaneously, interference is known to occur at several
different stages: task preparation (26), response selection (27,
28), and response production (29, 30). These limitations, often
referred to as the ‘‘psychological refractory period’’ (31, 32),
could easily account for the observed delay (25). Moreover, a
number of studies have shown that the presence of attention
decreases perceptual latencies (33) and reaction times to a
significant extent (34–36). This could also explain the observed
delay.
Are the above results due to the high biological and evolu-
tionary relevance of the target category ‘‘animal’’? In other
words, could we obtain a similar result using a man-made object
category (e.g., vehicles) (19)? We tested one group of five
subjects with both categorization tasks. In the vehicle task, target
images included cars, trains, airplanes, ships, etc. Half of the
distractors were animal scenes, whereas the other half contained
neither animals nor vehicles (Fig. 3c). The animal task was
essentially the same as in the main experiment (Figs. 2 and 3a),
with the exception that 50% of the distractor images contained
vehicles (Fig. 3b). The two tasks were presented in alternation
and all stimuli were masked. Our results show that for each
individual subject there is no significant decrease in categoriza-
tion performance under the dual task condition compared with
the single task condition in both cases (Fig. 3 b and c, t test, P 
0.05). This result suggests that categorization of natural scenes in
the near absence of attention might well be a general phenom-
enon not limited to evolutionarily relevant object categories.
Another possible confound is that the subjects may not be
performing an animal (or vehicle) detection task, but rather may
be detecting the presence of a ‘‘foreground object.’’ Foreground
objects may be more frequent in image containing animals or
vehicles than in images containing scenery only. However, the
fact that animal photographs were used as distractors for the
vehicle task and vice versa makes this possibility implausible
because foreground objects were contained both in the target
and distractor images.
The interpretation of our findings relies on the assumption
that attention is allocated to the center of the visual field under
the dual task condition. This assumption is supported by the fact
that there is no decrease in the central performance under dual
task compared with single task conditions. This implies that
when the peripheral task does demand attention, performance
should suffer. To examine this question, we conducted two
control experiments in which the peripheral tasks involved either
discriminating a briefly presented letter followed by a mask (T
or L followed by F; Fig. 3d) or discriminating a briefly presented
and masked color disk (redgreen or greenred; Fig. 3e). These
tasks have been shown by Braun and colleagues (20) to require
attention. In both of these control experiments, the central task
was the same as in our previous experiments (five T’s and L’s
discrimination). We observed a sharp drop in performance of
both peripheral tasks (P  0.0001 in Fig. 3 d and e). Although
subjects can perform at 74 and 78% in peripheral single letter
and color tasks, respectively, they cannot do any better than
chance (individual paired t test for each subject, P  0.05;
average over all subjects is 51% for letter task and 51% for color
task) during the dual task scenarios. These results demonstrate
that attention is effectively allocated to the central task and
provide further evidence that extensive training does not nec-
essarily result in an improvement of performances. Subjects
performing these dual tasks received the same amount of
training as those performing the natural categorization tasks.
Discussion
Our findings show that rapid visual categorization of novel
natural scenes requires very little or no focal attention. Percep-
tion outside the focus of attention has mostly been reported for
simple salient stimuli (1, 2). In our task, however, human subjects
are actively searching for a complex category of objects whose
appearance is highly variable. It thus appears that a sophisticated
high level of representation (e.g., semantic) can be accessed
outside the focus of attention. It has already been argued that the
‘‘gist’’ of a visual scene could be available preattentively (37, 38).
In this context, the contents of the ‘‘gist’’ could in fact be
extended to include information about the presence of a complex
target category whose appearance is not known in advance.
These results suggest that if attention gates visual information
processing at early stages of the visual system, such as V1 and V2
(2, 39–41), it cannot do so in an ‘‘all-or-nothing’’ fashion. At least
some information from unattended parts of the visual field can
Fig. 2. Main results. Individual subject’s results for dual vs. single task
performance (five subjects). The horizontal axis represents performance of the
central task (attentionally demanding letter discrimination task). The vertical
axis represents performance of the peripheral task (natural scene categoriza-
tion). Each filled circle represents the performance of one block (96 trials per
block) under the dual task condition. All images used for testing were novel
for the subjects. Each open circle represents the average performance under
the single task condition. For each subject, performances of the letter discrim-
ination task do not differ significantly (t test, P  0.05) under the single and
dual task conditions, suggesting that attention was fully allocated to the
center in the dual task condition. Furthermore, the performances of the
natural scene categorization task do not differ significantly (t test, P  0.05)
either under the single and dual task conditions, suggesting that the task may
be performed while attention is engaged elsewhere.
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Fig. 3. (a) Summary of categorization of masked animal images. This panel corresponds to the normalized average performance of the main experiment
(Fig. 2). Each open circle is the average value of one subject’s dual task performance, normalized according to hisher own single task performance: a linear
scaling transforms the average single task performance into 100%, leaving chance at 50%. Performance under the dual task condition that is higher than
the corresponding performance under the single task condition would result in a normalized performance higher than 100%. Error bars reflect the
standard error of the means. (b and c) Categorization of natural and artificial objects. The same five subjects performed the following two categorization
tasks in alternating blocks. (b) Categorization of masked animal images among vehicles and other distractors. Distractors for this task include 50% vehicle
scenes and 50% non-animalnon-vehicle scenes, randomly drawn from the same database described in Fig. 1b. Task performance for each of the five
subjects is comparable under dual task and single task conditions (t test, P  0.05). This panel presents a summary of normalized average performance
of each subject as detailed in a. (c) Categorization of masked vehicle images. Subjects are instructed to perform the natural scene categorization task by
using vehicles as targets (including cars, trucks, trains, airplanes, ships, and hot-air balloons). Distractors for this task include 50% animal scenes and 50%
non-animalnon-vehicle scenes. The panel illustrates normalized dual task performances of the five subjects. For each subject, task performance is
comparable under dual task and single task conditions (P  0.05). These experiments provide evidence that artificial and natural target categories can be
detected in the near absence of attention. (d and e) Control experiments. (d) Peripheral letter discrimination task. Five subjects are instructed to
discriminate between the letters T and L presented in the periphery. The letter, randomly rotated, is masked by the letter F after the peripheral SOA
(ranging from 53 to 160 ms). For each subject, this peripheral letter discrimination task cannot be performed above chance in the absence of attention
(paired t test, P  0.05). This panel presents a summary of normalized average performance of each subject. (e) Peripheral color pattern discrimination
task. Five subjects are instructed to discriminate a redgreen color disk from a greenred color disk. The stimulus is masked after the peripheral SOA
(ranging from 66 to 106 ms). For each subject this peripheral color pattern discrimination task cannot be performed above chance in the absence of
attention (paired t test, P  0.05). The results from these control experiments demonstrate that our central discrimination task effectively withdraws
attention away from the peripheral task (1). This panel presents a summary of normalized average performance of each subject.
9600  www.pnas.orgcgidoi10.1073pnas.092277599 Li et al.
reach higher-level areas of the infero-temporal cortex and
medial temporal lobe, where selective neuronal responses to
various categories of objects have been found (42–45).
The ability to rapidly categorize highly variable natural scenes
outside the focus of attention might constitute an evolutionary
advantage (46, 47). This type of preattentive behavior can be
contrasted with a more flexible but time-consuming mode of
processing, in which focal attention might be necessary for
granting access to visual awareness. It is commonly believed that
only elementary scene properties such as orientation, motion
and brightness gradients (i.e., properties that must have direct
physiological correlates in the mechanisms of the early visual
system) may be detected while attention is engaged elsewhere.
Our findings challenge this classical view.
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